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INTRODUCTION 
Community energy policy'has two principal objectives : 
(a) to reduce dependence on imported energy (Part I of this paper); 
(b) to improve security of those supplies which we inevitably 
have to import (Part II). 
Nearly three years have passed since the oil crisis of 1973, but 
progress towards these objectives remains very modest, in contrast 
with the urgency that the present situation should command. 
It is essential that the Council has a broad and substantive dis-
cussion on future energy prospects and give guidance on how he 
wishes to make further progress in Community policy. 
I. REDUCED DEPENDENCE 
1. The Council decided on 17 December 1974 to reduce dependence on 
imported energy from 60% to ~0% by 1985 (*). (It is clear 
that the more ambitious target of 40 % adopted at the same 
time is now beyond the Community's reach). 
The latest figures in Annex I,.- though highly tentative because 
it is particularly difficult at the moment to forecast so far 
in the future - show that the 50 % is now in doubt, even though 
(following our experience of lower energy demand growth during 
the last two years) we have reduced the 1985 forecast energy 
requirement itself by some 8 :. Imported oil may still represent 
around 45 % of our energy sur .~s (as against the 37 % which 
(*) OJ N° C 135 of 9.7.1975, p.2. 
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we were aiming at). These forecasts assume an annual economic 
growth rate of 4 \% to 5 %, a figure which Ministers might 
regard as the·lowest allowing reasonable social and economic 
progress. Failure to achieve this growth would ease our 
energy problems - but in an unwelcome way. 
2. The.reasons for this disappointing prospect are several. It 
will be difficult to sustain domestic coal production because 
of increased costs and a prospective reduction in power station 
coal requirements. Unless more coal-fired generating stations 
are ordered, coal-burning capacity might fall by some 30 GWe 
by 1985. Oil and natural gas production may fall short of 
earlier expectations. 
3. The main change, however, is that nuclear programmes have gone 
forward more slowly than earl~er planned, partly because of 
technical and environmental factors and partly because of a 
fall in electricity demand which may prove to be only temporary. 
In mid-1974, a nuclear generating capacity of 176 MWe in 1985 
was forecast (*). Current forecasts amount to 125 GWe, of 
which almo~t 90 GWe are currently operating, being built or on 
order : for at least 35 GWe decisions are still to be taken. 
. - . 
If shortfalls in the supply of nuclear electricity are to 
be met by increasing oil imports, this will jeopardize futher the 
reduced depend~nce objective and helping to strenghten oil prices. 
4. Looking at the short term, as a result of the economic recession, 
we were able in 1974 and 1975 to show a falling demand for 
energy and oil; but consumption in the first half of 1976 was 
., 
• 
.. 
9 %higher than a year earlier, and the trend is continuing. 1 
Wlth an oil price incre.ase likely by the end of this year, this 
rising trend is a matter of serious concern. 
(*) At the end of 1974, ta-rgets were set at 160 G\-Je-200 GWe, 
corresponding respectively to th.e 50 i., a.nd. 40 % dependence 
objectives set for 1985. 
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An upturn in oil imports will oertain~ be a heavy charge for the 
balanoe of payments. If, in addition, the price of O.il is to rise, the 
• terms of trade will also deteriorate. All this will o~~tain~ compromise 
'' '··-
~\ •' ·. 
the efforts of member" States to restore stability to their economies. 
Annual figures are as follows : 
Total energy consumption (in 
Millions of tons c. oil 
equivalent - M Toe) 
Percentage change over previous 
year 
Oil consumption in M Toe 
Percentage change over previous 
year 
(See also Annexes 2 and 3) 
1973 1974 
936 918 
+ 6% - 2% 
555 520 
+ 6% - 6% 
1975 1976 
(forecast)· 
861 907 
- 9% + 5% 
472 500 
- 9% + 6% 
5. The longer term oil supply situation is likely in any case to 
present problems. Oil consuming areas, notably the Community, 
the USA and Japan, will have to rely on OPEC countries for a 
large part of their incremental oil_dema~~; the world might 
need as ~eh as 38 milliorr: barrels· per' diy of OPEC oil by 1985 
compared with 28 milli_ons this year. b'f:·;·the .38 milliops- in .·: · 
1985, the Community m.ay neeci 'as tm.i.~h a~ 12 milliqri barrel~ a: · 
,. 
<:lay (as compared with 10 -~t · pr,~e-~~l•.' ::~~~r allowing for North ._ /t 
Sea production. · -;~:~~.:t~~::~;;--:_- · ---~--. i!{t. 
•'. ,_·_::_h~t.{~r:.:.-;::. "'· :::/<· :." .. ,;;· 
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6. The danger _li~s in th·e fact tha~ at~hbtt~~ Saudi' Arab_t~l-;:·;:t~e _ : ~--t::: ·--.-~-~:~.:~-:--~-
largest of 'the OPEC producers, h~s::~t:l-ie "ftapacity to increase -:c 
: · ··~< · · · ~.:Yt~~~,t~e~ovp::d~~::~:l:0:~1:h::~"::n~: :~_c::s l::s t:: <••?:.Jfl: I. , .·,t*,-
" •, ~ - ~ ---~-
required to meet Saudi revenue needs. The Saudi government ·.4-· 
-·:J~' 
has already said that production will not be allowed to rise.:-> :fi 
beyond 8~ million barrels per day, whereas, if the world - ..!·:~\ 
requirement rises to 38 million barrels by 1985, at least 
~':.-..cT2~.11i1-:l8:i~bal:ii!II'HEwtbtnr~··t!tr.r.oonlJrm..,Olb&S!IIl.db:<Arabia. 
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A decision to produce at this level will be essentially political:...i..: i '· 
rather than economic in character. The situation would at best. \. \l 
lead to pronounced upward pressure on oil prices and would at 1 
' 
worst limit plans for economic growth in the Community and i • 
other parts of the industrialized world. · ~ 
• 
7. There is indeed the danger that, unless present world economic 
recovery proves shortlived, we may face an awkward period as 
early as 1977, with demand for Saudi Arabian oil rising beyond 
their 8~ million barrel limit for a limited period before North 
Sea and Alaskan oil start to flow in quantity. 
. ~ 
7 a. The following paragraphs discuss how we should deal with this 
situation. The development of unconventional energy sources (wind, 
solar, wave power, etc.) is not covered in detail since these are 
unlikely to contribute much during the next 10 years or so. But we 
must continue to devote adequate resources to them, and keep in close 
touch with work in other industrial countries, since we m~ have 
to re~ heavily on unconventional sources towards the latter part of 
the century, particularly if difficulties increase for nuclear energy. 
PROTECTION AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF COMMUNITY ENERGY RESOURCES 
8. Folloidng _the European Council met in Rome in December 1975, the 
Commission proposed a balanced package of measures to help 
towards reduced dependence (*) : 
(a) An agreement in principle was suggested for : 
- lightening the financial burden of cyclical stocking of 
coal; such a proposal might cost a maximum of 50 m u.a. 
per year; 
- extending until 1985 and improving the existing aid 
scheme for coking coal and coke (some 36 m u.a. per year 
to be shared between Community budget, governments· and 
steel industry); 
(*) COM(76) 20, 16 January 1976. 
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- adopting a safeguard system to protect domestic energy 
sources, including oil, against a precipitate drop in 
imported energy prices (minimum safeguard price); 
- granting Community aid to oil exploration (50 m u.a. 
to be spent over 3 years). 
(b) A 500 mill-' .~n u.a. Euratom loan scheme for the financing 
of nuclear power stations and fuel cycle installations. 
- 5 -
(c) Further studies were proposed on other measures : 
- promoting the use of coal in power stations to avoid the 
shortfall referred to in paragraph 2 (maximum 50 m u.a. 
per year); 
- guarantees or loan schemes for new energy investments in 
cases where special difficulties arise. The Commission 
believes that the Community's fund raising capacity 
might be further exploited to this end. 
9. The common object of these measures is to help reduce dependence 
by encouraging Community oil an~ gas exploration and production, 
coal consumption and coal production, nuclear energy and new 
energy sources. Not all of the proposals are of equal impor-
tance. Some may require deeper examination, while others are 
ready for quick decision, and supplementary ones might later 
appear desirable. Attempts to link the various measures 
closely and to reach all decisions on the package at the same 
time will impede progress severely. 
10. However, at present, Member States have declined to accept 
the general outlines of the package as the basis for later 
decisions on the individual measures contained within it. 
Energy Savings 
11. To achieve the Community objective of reducing energy consump-
tion by 15% in 1985, compared to 1973's forecast(*), means 
that considerable pressure over a number of years must be 
exerted to alter consumption patterns. But the strong impetus 
given by the 1973/1974 crisis is now losing strength. 
(*) Council Resolution of 17l12.1974. The 1985 objectives and 
forecasts discussed earlier assume that we meet this 15 % 
savings target. 
" . ~ 
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12. Community actions in this field should : 
- help exchange of experience betw~en national administrations 
and encourage new ideas; 
- avoid distortions qf competition and obstacles to free 
circulation; 
- help public accept~nce; 
- help strengthen ou~ external bargaining position. 
13. Groups of experts will shortly rec<~mmend a second batch of 
specific measures bu~ we now need ~o review if our 15% target 
can be held, and the extent to whi~h we can relate it to 
national plans or ta~gets. 
14. Pricing will, of course, remain th~ most effective instrument 
of an energy savings policy. But the use of it is limited 
by counterinflationary policies and the problem of maintaining 
price differentials between compet~ng energy sources. Further, 
if price increases for domestic energy can be passed on in the 
form of high~7gt~aims, the effects are nullified. 7he present 
level of oil product prices: in many of the Member States~ 
is 5-10 % lower in real terms than it was at rnid-1974 (when 
governments had allowed for the sudden crude oil price increase 
to be reflected in product prices)~ 
15. Difficult as all the policy implications may be, energy 
saving is cheaper th~n energy inve~tment, which already 
absorbs some 25 1. of the total indvstrial investment of the 
Community. 
National Programmes 
-
,· 
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16. A first attempt was made early thi$ year to review national I 
energy programmes, in the light of 1985 objectives; to identify 1 
'· gaps and problems, and to see wher~ policies conflict. 
Financing aspects were given special attention JJ.nd - not 
without difficulties and uncertaincies '7 it: was possible to 
evaluate the large amount of investment ne~ .. ~~sary if current 
national plans are to be achieved \see Anae:K 4: 
-··- .. , ·~-- ·" .... -
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17. The Commission believes that such ~eviews should be continued 
op a regular basis. 
I 
J 
' I' 
!' 
II. SECURITY OF IMPORTED SUPPLIES t 
• 
18. The Community is likely to remain the world's biggest oil 
importer, and we need to foster goqd relations with the oil 
producers (OPEC) as well as good ~tual understanding with 
other industrialized countries. 
Discussions with the producers are now going on in the Paris 
Dialogue (CIEC), and certain aspec~s of energy are being 
covered in the Euro/Arab Dialogue ~nd in negotiations with 
individual countries. 
19. For the present, by far the most iroportant forum is of course 
the Paris Dialogue. ,Our aim here ts to increase the security 
for future oil supplies, and if possible encourage moderation 
on oil prices, by trying to develop an atmosphere of mutual 
understanding; by identifying the mutual interests of our-
selves, the oil producers, and the poorer developing countries 
in an orderly world energy market; and by working towards 
arrangements for continued consultation on energy/oil. To a 
great extent, the climate in the Energy Commission in CIEC 
will be affected by progress made tn other areas such as 
aid and developing countries'debt. Despite our best efforts, 
we can expect the producers to con~inue to press unacceptable 
demands, like oil price indexation~ and to increase oil prices 
again at the end of this year. 
l 
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20. 
i 
Most of the oi .. l exporting countries plan to construct refineries j 
within their own territories. The implementation of this ~ 
policy would create difficulties for the Community where l 
there exists a surplus of refining capacity. This question 
is presently under careful st·udy by the Commission with the 
help o£ national experts from the Member States. 1 
r 
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21. Uranium, too, could become a problem as there is a danger of 
shortage in the early 1980s. One of the major suppliers, 
Canada, could limit exports and Au:;tralia has yet to make 
decisions on whether and how much natural uranium to export. 
Some other supplies are from politically unstable areas. 
In these circumstances, it is impoTtant to promote uranium 
exploration and to continue discussions with the major uranium 
producing countries with a view to obtaining secure supplies. 
22. All these uncertainties mean that, whatever difficulties we 
find in implementing individual parts of the present Commission \. 
package, major efforts are necessary to reduce dependence on 
external supplies on the lines discus&ed in Paxt T of this 
paper. We also need to reach early agreement on tncasures 
required in the event of a new supply crisis. Recom~aendations 
about our refinery capacity and· about uranium supplies \vill 
be brought forward at the appropri~te time. 
III. CONCLUSION 
23. Faster progress on all fronts is badly needed to make Community 
energy policy a political reality, both inten1ally and exter-
nally. 
24. The- Council will, to this end, wish to discuss ; 
~ The disturbing rising trend of energy and oil consumption, 
- TI1e problem of reducing dependence and how we move ahead 
(including a timetable). Ministers might also wish to 
consider whether further measures should be added to the 
Commission's package, 
The importance of energy savings, and the instructions to 
be given to officials in the future development of this work, 
including consideration of the role of pricing policy. 
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25. Tr .. e Co1mcil should also take note of: 
- the progress being made in CIEC and other external discus- , 
sions, 
- the need for early decisions on emergency measures. 
Brussels, September 1976 
* 
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Annexes: 1: A comparison between 1985 objectives for the 
Community and current estimates for 1985. 
2: Recent trends on the energy market. 
3; Community energy situation 1972/1976. 
4: Energy investments in the Connnunity 1976-1985. 
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Annex 1 
A comparison between 1985 objectives tor the Community (1) and 
current estimates for 1985 (2) 
1985 objective 1985 forecast" 
!I Total enerSl needs 1~475 m.toe 1.350 m. toe 
of which gross internal oonsumpti on 
represents 1.400 m. toe 1.300 m. toe 
(3) 
II. Import dependena,y 50 % 40 % if pose. 55% to 50% 
i:II. Nuclear objective 160 GWe 200 GWe 125 ewe (of which 
decisions are still 
to be made on 30-40 
IV. Supply : 
Internal production (in m.toe) 
of which nuclear energy repres~nts 
Import (in m.toe) 
of whi eh impor·ted oil (crude and refined 
800 
190 
675 
540 
. 900 
240 
575-
420 
I CTI'/e) 
590- 690 
120 (4) - 160 
760 .... 660 
635 - 535 
procucts) ~-~~~~-----------------·------·--------#-----~~------·----~--~-----------~·----
V. Cc~tributiona of the different 
forms of ener& (£i:!) -
- solid fuels 17 
- oil 49 
- natural gas 18 
- electricity (including hydro-eleotrioit~ 
and geothermal) 3 
- nuclear 13 
100 
3 
16 
lOO 
16,0 
55,0- 52,5 
17,5- 18,00 
2,5 
9 (4)- 12 
lOO 
-----------------------'-------~-----·----·---·----
(l) Council Resolution of the 17 December 1974 (O.J. c. 153, 9/7/75) 
(2) Compiled in mid 1976 from the most recent figures supplied by the member States. 
(3) Based on the assumption of a GNP growth rate of 4.5/5% per year. Plus or minus 
one percent corresponds to a difference in groes internal consumption of 
approximately 120 M toe by 1985 ot wr~oh 80/100 Mtoe ot oil. 
The difference between objectives (1.475 Mtoe) and fo~~oaata (1.350) 1• a oonaequeno« 
of the poor eoonomio situation of 1974/76. • 
(4) Planta in operation, in oonatruotion and ordered onq" 
/o 
Arm ex 2 
Recent trends on the energy market 
·t. Enercy consumpti.o11 and prcduction (in 
a) jnternal c~de cons~ption ot pri-
mary energy 
of which oil 
b) intern,·;.l crude oroduction of 
primary energy 
of which oil 
II. Energy market trends 
b 
a) Energy d~pendence in terms of 
impede (in %) 
b) .Annual va.riatic.n rates 
in rel~tion to the preceding year 
(in %) 
GNP 
Internal energy consumption 
of which oil represents 
Internal energy prod'l:4otion · 
Net energy imports . 
of which orude and refined oil 
represents 
c) Indines (1970 • lOO) 
G1iP 
Internal energy consumption a 
oil _/ 
Internal energy production 
Net energy import 1 
crude and refined oil 
1973 
m. toe) 
936 
555 
365 
12 # 
63 % 
+ 5,3% 
% + 6 
+ 6 % 
+ 3,5 % 
+ 7 % 
+ 7 % 
113 
112 
118 
106 
117 
118 
1974 1975 
918 861 
520 472 
368 386 
ll 12 
I I 62,5 % 57 % 
+ 2,1% - 2,5% 
1 % - 2 - 6 
- 6 ~ -9 % 
' 
+l % -T5 '% 
-3 % -12% 
-4 % - 15 ~. 
116 113 
llO 103 
110 lOO 
107 112 
113 lOO 
113 97 
l976(estim.) 
907 
500 
405 
25 
57 ,~ 
+ 4,5% 
%. + 5 
+6 ~ 
+5 ~ 
+ 3 % 
+4 % 
118 
109 
106 
118 
103 
lOl 
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Annex ll-31 Annexe ~ 
!.: io toi!-tep 
Et!ERGV: Produc·iion of primary sources 
Ef:!ERGIE= Prodcction de sources pri:-;laires 
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Energy Invastmants in the Oo~m~Ulity (1) 
1976-1985 
(Milliard Units of Account) (2) 
-
197 6-1985 
COAL 
A. Production 10 
HYDROCARBONS 
. 
A. Production 22 
B. Refining and 18 
distribution -
TOTAL 40 
. 
NATURAL GAS 
A. Production 9 
B. Distribution 20 
infras true ·cure -
TOT.b.L 29 
--'"'-
NUCLEAR ELECTRICITY 
A. Production 62 
CONVENTIONAL 
ELECTRICITY 
A. Primary production 2 
B. Secondary production 18 
TOTAL 
-20 
B. Transmission and distri~ 49 but ion of electricity 
TOTAL 
Investments A 1C5 
Investments B 105 
-
Investments A+B 210 
( 1 J Source z :Based on document XVII/135/76, 7 M~q 1976 
(2) In constant termsz Exchange rates as of the '0 December 1974• 
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